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ABSTRACT 
Previous research shows that for autobiographical memories of 
immoral actions, people tend to judge their own actions as less 
morally wrong and negative than actions in which others lied to 
them. Additionally, people tend to judge events that are further in 
the past as more morally wrong and negative than recent events. 
However, this only accounts for personal memories. We not only 
form and retain personal experiences, but the experiences 
encountered by others (vicarious memories). Studies have 
indicated similarities between personal and vicarious memories 
such that the present study aims to build upon existing research and 
explore these similarities in the context of morality. Twenty 
participants recalled six memories of lying from three different 
perspectives; actor, recipient and vicarious and the data was 
sampled from two temporal distances for each perspective; recent 
and distant. Each memory was followed by a series of associated 
ratings for phenomenological and functional qualities. Results show 
that for memories of lying, people judge their own behaviours as 
less morally wrong and less negative than when others have lied to 
them and when someone has lied to a friend or family member. 
Results found no significant effect for temporal distance. 
Phenomenological and functional qualities of vicarious memories 
closely resembled those of personal memories demonstrating that 
vicarious memories may in fact influence the construction of one’s 
self-identity over time. These findings are discussed in relation to 
existing research in the field of autobiographical memory, moral 
psychology and vicarious memory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Autobiographical memories are recollections of personal past experiences. Given the 
focus on personal experiences, research confirms (e.g. Conway, 2005) that 
autobiographical memories are central to the self. It appears that the majority of the 
memories that make up our autobiography, are moral laden and therefore morality 
plays a significant role in the construction of the self. Research into autobiographical 
memory and morality has found that for memories of specific events such as lying, 
people tend to judge their own actions as less morally wrong and negative than actions 
in which others lied to them (Stanley Henne, Iyengar, Sinnott-Armstrong & De Brigard, 
2017). As well as perceiving ourselves as better than our peers, we have the tendency 
to judge events that are further in the past as more morally wrong and negative than 
more recently occurring events (Stanley et al, 2017). Nevertheless, this research only 
explores the way we recall specific events that have been directly experienced by us 
i.e. personal autobiographical memories. People not only have the ability to form and 
retain personal experiences as autobiographical memories, but the experiences 
recounted by other people. These memories are referred to as vicarious 
autobiographical memories (Pillemer, Steiner, Kuwabara, Thomsen, Svob, 2015) and 
have yet to be explored in the context of morality. In order to fill this gap within the 
existing research, the current study is the first of its kind to assess the 
phenomenological and functional qualities of not just personal memories of immoral 
actions, but vicarious memories of immoral actions. This novel piece of research builds 
upon three distinct domains; autobiographical memory, moral psychology and 
vicarious memory. The following section will provide a thorough literature review of 
current research in the field of autobiographical memory with an explicit focus on the 
way we as human beings use our autobiographical memory to remember moral laden 
events and how this aids the development and maintenance of our self-identity. 
Furthermore, existing research into the importance of vicarious memory when 
considering self-identity will be explored and subsequently will be followed by an 
overview of the aims concerning the present research. 
1.1. Personal autobiographical memories and the self 
Autobiographical memories (AM) can be described as the recollections of one’s 
personal past events and are characterised by a sense of subjective time, autonoetic 
awareness (Tulving 1972, 2002, 2005) and feelings of emotional re-experience 
(Tulving 1983); for example, an individual who remembers when they did their first 
bungee jump, will think about the time in which that event occurred, imagine 
themselves as being there and feel the exhilaration of the jump itself. Collectively these 
memories form a network called autobiographical memory which forms the basis of an 
individual’s unique personal life story (Fivush, 2011). Autobiographical memory 
consists of an episodic and a semantic domain (Urbanowitsch, Gorenc, Herold & 
Schröder, 2013; Chessell, Rathbone, Souchay, Charlesworth & Moulin, 2014). 
Episodic autobiographical memory refers to the remembering of time and place 
specific events, for example, your first day at university. Episodic autobiographical 
memory typically involves the recollection of vivid emotional, perceptual and sensory 
detail (Tulving 2002). Semantic autobiographical memory refers to the recollection of 
factual information relating to one’s personal past experiences independent of both 
place and time, for example, ‘I am a psychologist’. Both episodic and semantic 
autobiographical memories involve past self-concepts, however, during episodic 
retrieval we have the ability to experience ‘mental time travel’. This allows us, through 
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the medium of autonoetic consciousness, to become detached from the present and 
mentally project ourselves in both temporal directions-past and future. As a result we 
are able to imagine personal past happenings and our own potential future happenings 
(Tulving 2005, Suddendorf & Corballis 1997), an ability that is probably unique to 
humans (Tulving, 1983, Suddenhorf & Corballis 2007, Suddenhorf, Addis & Corbasllis 
2009). 
Due to personal experiences being paramount to autobiographical memory, it is 
assumed that memories of our lives have an intimate connection with our sense of 
who we are. The underlying presumption is that autobiographical memory is a major 
component of the ‘self’ and without it, we would have no existing sense of who we are. 
It has previously been found that memories can be altered to support the different 
aspects of the self and this can be referred to as self-coherence (Conway, Singer & 
Tagini 2004). Coherence acts on all aspects of memory coding to shape the access 
of memories and their content. This process means that memory is in fact coherent 
with an individual’s motivations, goals, self-images and beliefs. Therefore, the self and 
memory create a coherent system whereby an individual’s beliefs and knowledge of 
the self are supported and verified by autobiographical memories of that individual’s 
specific past experiences (Conway, 2005). When individual’s self-attitudes, beliefs and 
goals change, their memories are adjusted accordingly (Ross, 1989). For example, 
consider the following: an individual could recall a memory of a time their favourite 
sports team won an important game, however, they fail to recall how unfairly their team 
played throughout the game. The positive aspect of the memory is considerably more 
accessible than the negative aspect, therefore maintaining coherence between 
memory recall and the working self. Additionally, someone supporting the opposing 
team may recall how unfairly that team played because it is more coherent with their 
own attitudes, beliefs and goals and as a consequence, more accessible. 
During late adolescence through to early adulthood, people within modern society 
begin to form combined narratives of the ‘self’ by re-experiencing the past and 
imagining the future in such a way that establishes one’s purpose (McAdams 2001).  
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) proposed the Self-Memory system (SMS) as a 
model of autobiographical memory in which memories are temporary mental 
frameworks. The SMS contains two essential concepts: an autobiographical 
knowledge base and the working self. The autobiographical knowledge base forms an 
individual’s life story and has been established as having three main levels; Specific 
events, lifetime periods and general events. Lifetime periods such as, when I went to 
University, when I lived at X and so on refer to thematic knowledge about that period 
of time as well as temporal knowledge regarding the duration of a period of time. These 
are autobiographical memories that have a clear beginning and end. Secondly, 
general events are more specific than lifetime periods and include both single events 
(e.g. my trip to New York) and repeated events (e.g. morning dog walks in the woods). 
Robinson (1992, as cited in Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) also suggested that 
sets of associated events may fall under this category. Robinson (1992) found that 
‘mini-histories’ such as a first romantic relationship and learning to drive a car were 
organised around individual goal-achievement memories. These memories showed to 
communicate knowledge of particular significance for the self (e.g. interpersonal skills 
and skill acquisition ability). Furthermore, participants showed to recall highly vivid 
memories for pivotal goal-attainment moments such as driving alone for the first time 
or a first kiss and Robinson (1992) proposed that these first-time events served an 
important function in determining the nature of the self. The final type of 
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autobiographical memory is event-specific knowledge which is characterised by vivid 
imagery of a time and place specific event for example, having a conversation with Y 
or your favourite date with your current partner. The autobiographical knowledge base 
is organised as a hierarchy where lifetime periods act as a cue for general events 
which go on to cue the retrieval of event specific knowledge. Furthermore, the working 
self is described by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) as one’s current conception of 
the self that holds the individual’s life goals and is time and context dependant. The 
working self is linked with Baddeley’s (1986) working memory model in which the 
control processes within the working memory are involved in autobiographical memory 
retrieval and encoding. The working self therefore regulates access to the 
autobiographical knowledge information based on the coherence between the 
autobiographical memories and an individual’s current working self. In other words, 
memories that confirm the goals, attitudes and beliefs of the individual will be highly 
accessible compared to those which are perceived as being in conflict or undermine 
the individual’s current working self. 
Although the self-identity function is the most emphasised within autobiographical 
memory research, Williams, Conway and Cohen (2008) suggested that 
autobiographical memory serves as a social and directive function as well (also see 
Bluck, 2003). Firstly, reminiscing about the first time you met your significant other with 
family and friends for example, can be a positive and socially encouraging experience. 
(Neisser, 1988). The sharing of these memories creates a sense of intimacy between 
individuals (Alea & Bluck 2003).  Disturbance to the autobiographical memory due to 
neurological impairments (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease or Amnesia) could therefore be 
the reason that people feel like they disconnect from the impaired individual (Robinson 
& Swanson 1990, Alea & Bluck 2003). Furthermore, Alea & Vick (2010) assessed the 
social function of autobiographical memory in romantic couples and found higher 
marital satisfaction levels amongst individuals who stated that they often reminisce 
with their partners about times that define their relationship. Results therefore provide 
significant support for the social function and benefit of autobiographical recollection. 
Secondly, the directive function uses past experiences as a reference point and a 
guide for our present and future actions (Pillemer, 2003), for example, you remember 
what happened the last time you lead a group at work and subsequently use this 
information to guide your behaviour the next time you lead a group. 
A strong link between autobiographical memory and an individual’s self-identity has 
been established within existing research (e.g. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce 2000, 
Conway, Singer & Tagini 2004). However, in a similar and more specific vein of 
research it is suggested that morality plays an essential role in the perception of one’s 
self-identity (Strohminger et al, 2017). The following section draws upon research 
exploring the way we recall specific autobiographical memories of moral laden events 
(both immoral and moral) and the way these event specific memories influence the 
shaping of one’s self-identity.  
1.2. Morality and the Self 
According to the dominant cognitive-developmental approach, moral motivation 
requires an individual to act against their own self-interests and tendencies out of duty, 
obligation and sacrifice (Walker 2013) and therefore, morality should not serve one’s 
self interests or self-beliefs. However, our moral judgment strongly influences both the 
way we view others and the way we view ourselves (Stanley et al, 2017; Escobedo & 
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Adolphs, 2010). It appears that a significant proportion of the memories that are most 
important to us and which our self depends on, are moral laden autobiographical 
memories and so morality is a fundamental part of the formation and understanding of 
an individual’s self-identity (Strohminger, Knobe & Newman, 2017). However, there 
have been very few studies that have actively explored the way we remember moral 
and immoral events and consequently their role in the shaping of one’s self-identity. 
Existing research in moral psychology suggests that memories are vulnerable to 
distortion and biases upon recollection (Alicke & Govorun, 2005), for example, 
scholars have found evidence that remembering is a re-constructive process (e.g. 
Katz, 1989; Montgomery & Rajagopal 2018). On recollection, people do not retrieve 
the memory as whole or complete but instead reconstruct it using accessible 
information within their memory and information associated with the memory. It has 
also been suggested that post event information has the ability to overwrite original 
information within the memory resulting in the creation of false memories (Loftus, 
Donders, Hoffman & Schooler, 1989). Distortions can lead to self-enhancement 
(Alicke & Govorun, 2005) and this bias is of particular relevance when considering the 
retrieval of moral laden memories. When a person’s perception of themselves is better 
or more positive than their perception of others, they may have actively compared 
themselves in order to boost their own self-perceptions or reduce their perception of 
others. Self-enhancement can occur without social comparison but either way the self 
is seen as better than other people therefore maintaining a positive identity. 
Furthermore, people have been found to remember their past in such a way that 
minimises negativity and maximises the positivity in which they view themselves 
(Escobedo & Adolphs 2010) compared to the way they view others (Conway, Singer 
& Tagini, 2004, Stanley et al 2017). People are therefore more likely to recall positive 
past experiences of themselves than they are to recall positive past experiences of 
other people (D’Argembeau & Linden 2008). In other words, we are motivated to 
construct our autobiographical memory in a specific way that supports and maintains 
a positive self-view (Thomsen & Pillemer 2016) and leaves an individual feeling valued 
and significant (Kaufman, Cundiff & Crowell, 2015). Overall, this is consistent with the 
idea that memories with a low correspondence to the original event (i.e. one’s that 
aren’t completely accurate) can be beneficial in terms of maintaining a positive self-
identity because the individual’s memory is coherent with their current beliefs attitudes 
and goals (Conway & Loveday 2015, Demirey & Bluck 2011). 
Following on from this, Escobedo and Adolphs (2010) studied the way in which 
temporal distance of both moral and immoral actions effected an individual’s 
perception of themselves. 100 participants, who were unaware of the moral testing 
criterion, were given 30 cue words used specifically to prompt the recollection of moral 
laden events (e.g. ‘guilty’, ‘compassionate’, ‘unfaithful’, ‘proud’ etc.). Following 
recollection, participants were asked to complete a 52 item online questionnaire where 
they answered questions about the action in the memory, the emotions they felt 
regarding the behaviour and moral judgements regarding the memory. Results 
indicated that the more negatively valenced moral memories (e.g. guilt) were 
somewhat more inaccessible and distant than the positively valenced memories (e.g. 
pride). These findings suggest a temporal bias when it comes to establishing our 
personal autobiographical pasts, with the propensity to recall the more moral events 
as the most recent. This research is in accordance with the suggestion that 
autobiographical memories serve a self-enhancement function (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce 2000, Demiray & Janssen 2015) allowing us to maintain a positive self-identity.  
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Furthermore, of particular relevance to the present study, Stanley et al (2017) 
conducted a similar investigation to Escobedo & Adolphs (2010) however, it focused 
not only on our tendencies to display temporal bias when recalling moral laden 
experiences, but also the way we evaluate other people in comparison to ourselves. 
They focused on the phenomenological and functional qualities of autobiographical 
memories of two specific types of moral transgression; lying and emotional harm. In 
study 1a, 51 participants were invited to take part in a lab study and asked to recall 
specific autobiographical memories of lying from two different perspectives: actor and 
recipient. Memories from an actor perspective refer to memories of lies the participant 
had committed, and the recipient perspective refers to memories of lies committed to 
the participant. After recalling as many memories as they could within a 30 minute 
time-frame for each perspective, participants were asked to provide a total of six 
associated ratings on a 7 point scale. These ratings measured how well the participant 
remembered the event (1, hardly; 7, very well); how well they remembered how they 
felt during the event (1, not at all; 7, very well); perceived morality/immorality (1, very 
morally wrong; 7, very morally right); associated emotions (valence: 1, very negative; 
7, very positive); emotional intensity (1, not at all intense; 7, very intense) and 
perceived personal change since the event occurred (1, very similar; 7, very different). 
Study 1b was identical but for memories of emotional harm and Study 2 asked for 
participants to recall the same memories but for times when they perceived 
themselves as similar and different from their current self. Three conclusions were 
inferred: people perceive their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative 
than actions in which others had emotionally harmed or lied to them; people have a 
tendency to judge the more temporally distant actions to be more morally wrong than 
temporally recent actions; people judge their actions as more morally wrong when they 
believed they were a very different person to they are now compared to actions where 
they believed that they were very similar people to now.  
The results of Stanley et al’s (2017) and Escobedo & Adolph’s (2010) studies clearly 
demonstrate a self-enhancement bias which as a result maintains a positive self-
identity. The temporal self-appraisal theory (Wilson & Ross 2000) offers an 
explanation for this occurrence. According to this theory individuals are more 
motivated to remember more moral and positive experiences as significantly more 
recent than past negative and immoral experiences. This way people continue to feel 
they can take credit for the past positive or moral experiences which in turn benefits 
their self-view, whereas perceiving an immoral or negative experience as more 
temporally distant means that they can associate those previous experiences with a 
past self therefore, posing no harm to their current self. 
The present study adopts a similar methodology to Stanley et al (2017) which will be 
discussed further on however, their findings as well as those of and Escobedo & 
Adolph’s (2010) will be built upon by introducing the concept of vicarious 
autobiographical memories into the research. The notion of vicarious autobiographical 
memories and the research concerning it will be introduced in the following section in 
order to provide a thorough understanding as to its importance when considering the 
self.  
1.3.     Vicarious memories and the Self 
Although previous research into autobiographical memory focuses mainly on personal 
past experiences, this is not the only component of remembering episodic past events. 
Humans have the ability to not only form and retain memories of their own personal 
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lived experiences, but the past experiences that are reported by other people. Larsen 
and Plunkett (1987) were some of the first researchers to touch upon the difference 
between directly experienced events and events reported by others. They stated that 
these are the two different ways in which people gain knowledge about real life 
happenings in the world. For example, an individual may recall a vivid and emotionally 
intense positive memory of being handed their graduation certificate, or they may have 
a vivid and emotionally/physically intense memory of a graduation ceremony proudly 
described to them by an immediate family member. Similarly, a person may have a 
vivid and emotionally intense negative memory of an incident where they were 
physically abused as a young child, or they may have a vivid and emotionally intense 
memory of an incident of physical abuse described to them by a close friend.  
The following research looks into memories of events recounted to an individual by an 
external source, such as a significant other (e.g. boyfriend/girlfriend, friend or family 
member) rather than having experienced it first-hand. The term vicarious memories is 
used to refer to the recollections people have of specific events or episodes told to 
them by these external sources when they were not present. Furthermore, social 
cognition research has found that we mentally create models of other people 
consisting of information about their attitudes and traits and as a result it has been 
argued that the other person’s autobiographical memory information may be included 
as part of these mental models within the autobiographical memory base (Thomsen, 
Steiner, and Pillemer 2016). This effectively allows an individual to recall specific 
experiences from another person’s autobiographical narrative, for example, young 
adults are able to recall pivotal events from the life stories of their parents (Svob and 
Brown’s 2012). 
Although the recalled event hasn’t been experienced directly by the individual, the 
vicarious memory may hold various qualities that bear a resemblance to directly 
experienced personal memories (Pillemer et al 2015). These include 
phenomenological qualities such as emotional responses (valence and intensity), vivid 
imagery and physical reactions. Similarly to the, research into memory functions have 
mainly focused on events which involve the individual in them. Personal memories 
have been shown to have self, social and directive function (Williams, Conway & 
Cohen, 2008) although new research is beginning to explore the functional 
significance of vicarious autobiographical memory (Lind & Thomsen, 2018, Thomsen 
& Pillemer 2016).  Lind & Thomsen (2018) studied the similarities between empathy 
and self-identity functions of both personal and vicarious life stories. 240 students were 
asked to provide details of personal life chapters as well as a close other’s life 
chapters. Memories were rated for valence, causal connections, identity disturbance 
and empathy. The results indicated that the more positive personal chapters were 
rated as lower for identity disturbance and higher for empathy. Ratings for vicarious 
chapters were parallel to the ratings for personal chapters, however, showed empathy 
to be unrelated. These findings give evidence to support the notion that 
autobiographical memory contributes to self-identity but more importantly Lind & 
Thomsen (2018) provide significant supporting evidence for the influence of vicarious 
autobiographical memories on self-identity. Lind & Thomsen (2018) focus on life 
stories specifically however, research has extended this to specific vicarious memories 
and have identified significant results for the influence of specific vicarious memories 
on self-identity (Thomsen and Pillemer, 2016; Pillemer, Steiner, Kuwabara, Thomsen 
and Svob 2015). Pillemer et al (2015) conducted research exploring the similarities of 
memory qualities between the two types of specific autobiographical memory; 
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personal and vicarious. 141 psychology undergraduates were assigned to one of two 
conditions. In one condition participants were asked to recall a personal memory of a 
specific event from their own life which they had shared with a friend and a vicarious 
memory of a specific event from a friend’s life which they shared with the participant. 
In the second condition, participants were asked to recall the same 2 memories but 
the ‘friend’ was replaced with ‘a family member’. After each memory recollection, the 
participants were asked to provide a series of ratings concerning memory qualities 
using a five point Likert scale: how positive was the event; how negative was the event; 
how emotional they were when thinking about the memory; what type of emotion was 
experienced; how vivid was the memory; could they see the event in their mind’s eye; 
and did they have a physical reaction when recalling the memory. Ratings for memory 
functions were also provided on a five point scale: does the memory help me 
understand myself (self); make me feel better about myself (self); influence my 
relationships with other (social); helps me to solves problems in life (directive). The 
wording was altered for the vicarious memories to reflect the participant’s feelings 
towards the friend/family member’s event. Results found that vicarious memories 
share important functional and phenomenological qualities with personal memories, 
but at a lower intensity. These results provide supporting evidence for vicarious 
memories serving a significant self, social and directive function parallel to the 
phenomenological and functional qualities of personal autobiographical memories. 
Despite the potentiality of vicarious memories holding many similar qualities to 
personal memories, current memory models categorise personal and vicarious 
memories separately due to the impersonal nature of the vicarious memory. 
Vicarious memories are particularly important in terms of their implications. Research 
within clinical psychology has identified a significant impact that hearing stories of 
others’ distressing and potentially traumatic events and subsequently remembering 
them can have on professionals such as therapists. The hearing of these experiences 
is referred to as vicarious traumatisation and has a heavy focus within the research of 
vicarious memories. It is defined as the personal transformations in the self of trauma 
workers that occur as a result of engaging empathetically with a client’s reports of 
traumatic experiences that can cause symptoms similar to the client as well as cause 
the individual to change the way they perceive themselves and others (McCann & 
Pearlman 1990). Symptoms are conspicuous amongst a variety of professions 
vulnerable to hearing graphic descriptions of another person’s traumatic experiences, 
for example, emergency workers (Setti & Lourel 2016), therapists working with sexual 
abuse survivors (Brady & Guy & Poelstra & Brokaw 1999), medical students (Al-
Mateen et al, 2015), therapists working with sexual offenders (Moulden & Firestone 
2007), and solicitors for example (Vrklevski & Franklin, 2008). Research into vicarious 
traumatisation demonstrates the implication of vicarious memories however, research 
remains sparse. 
1.4.     Overview of the present research 
Autobiographical memory and it’s centrality to the self has been thoroughly researched 
over the past few decades. However, there’s a lack of research into specific 
autobiographical memories of immoral and moral experiences. Similarly, there is 
insufficient research into different types of vicarious memories and their effect on an 
individual’s self-identity. Therefore, a gap into the literature is evident for research that 
focuses on how individuals, when recalling personal autobiographical memories of 
immoral actions, perceive themselves in the present in comparison to other people as 
Page 10 of 26 
 
well as their previous selves. Additionally, the influence someone else’s recounted 
experiences can have on their own self-identity is yet to be explored. 
 The present study looks at the effect autobiographical memories of lying can have on 
one’s self-identity. Therefore, drawing from Stanley et al’s (2017) study into the effect 
of lying and emotional harm as well as Pillemer et al’s (2015) research into vicarious 
memories, the current study focuses on the influence of personal as well as vicarious 
memories of lying on one’s self-identity, as well as the phenomenological and 
functional qualities vicarious memories can have on the self.  Furthermore, the 
methodology  differentiates between three types of memory; actor - when the 
participant has lied to someone, recipient - when the participant has been on the 
receiving end of a lie, and vicarious - when a friend or family member has shared with 
the participant a time they have been lied to by someone. Additionally, the actor, 
recipient and vicarious memories were sampled from two temporal distances; recent 
(within the last year) and distant (more than a year ago). Lying was chosen as an 
appropriate immoral action to study as research has found that dishonesty is one of 
the most common immoral actions (Wilhelm, Wisneski, Brandt & Skitka, 2014) and 
social behaviours (Bryant, 2008) that exists in our everyday life. 
Although the current study is of novel quality, based on previous research, the 
following hypotheses have been created. Results are expected to replicate Stanley et 
al’s (2017) findings that the personal event in which the participant had lied to 
someone, both recent and distant, will be rated as less morally wrong than when the 
participant had been lied to. Another finding expected to replicate Stanley et al (2017) 
is the distant memories (more than a year ago) in the actor perspective, will be rated 
as more morally wrong and negative than the recent memories (within the last year) 
in the actor perspective. Based on currently available research on vicarious memories, 
it is expected that the ratings for vicarious memories will closely resemble the ratings 
for personal memories but to a lower intensity. Finally, vicarious memories are 
expected to be rated as less morally wrong than personal memories where the 
participant had been lied to (actor perspective). 
2.     METHOD 
2.1.     Participants 
37 participants took part in the questionnaire. However only 20 participants provided 
a full response. Data was analysed for the remaining 20 participants (M age=29, 
range=18-55). Undergraduate Psychology students at Leeds Beckett University who 
participated, received 4 SONA points on completion.  
2.2.     Ethical considerations 
Prior to making the study available, ethical approval was required from the Local 
Research Ethics committee (LREC) (see appendix i for ethical approval). 
2.3.     Materials and Procedure 
Participants were given the opportunity to take part in the current study via the Leeds 
Beckett University online participation system (SONA) and social media. Once they 
had clicked the link, participants were directed to Qualtrics.com and were provided 
with a virtual information (see appendix ii) sheet followed by a virtual consent form 
(see appendix iii). To demonstrate virtual informed consent, participants were required 
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to tick all boxes within the consent form. Participants were only able to begin the study 
if consent was given. 
On completion of the consent form, participants were asked to recall a total of six 
specific events of lying; 2 from an actor perspective, 2 from a recipient perspective 
and 2 from a vicarious perspective. Both questions for each condition were sampled 
from two temporal distances; recent (within the last year) and distant (more than a 
year ago). Participants gave ratings for one recollection before moving onto the 
subsequent memories. The order in which the questions were presented was 
counterbalanced within Qualtrics. Specific instructions for each part of the 
questionnaire are detailed below. 
 2.3.1.     Test Conditions 
Two of the six questions asked participants to recall a recent and distant specific event 
from their own personal pasts from an actor perspective; (a) Think back to a time within 
the last year and try to recall a specific memory of an event where you lied to someone; 
(b) Think back to a time more than a year ago a try to recall a specific memory of an 
event where you lied to someone, and a recent and distant specific event from a 
recipient perspective; (c) Think back to a time within the past year and try to recall a 
specific memory of an event where you discovered someone lied to you; (d) Think 
back to a time more than a year ago and try to recall a specific memory of an event 
where you discovered someone lied to you. The remaining two questions asked 
participants to recall one recent and one distant specific event recounted to them by a 
family member or friend (vicarious perspective); (e) Think back to a time within the 
past year and try to recall a specific memory of an event from a friend or family 
member’s life (that they told you about) where someone had lied to them; (f) Think 
back to a time more than a year ago and try to recall a specific memory of an event 
from a friend or family member’s life (that they told you about) where someone had 
lied to them.  
Participants who were able to identify and recall memories for each question were 
asked to describe the memory in 2-6 sentences, with the instruction to “try and provide 
as much detail as you can” for the personal memories and to “try to provide as much 
detail as they shared with you” for the vicarious memories.  Additionally, participants 
were asked to specify the temporal distance in days for a recent memory (“within the 
last year”) or years for a distant memory (“more than a year ago”). Definitions were 
provided for different types of lies.  
2.3.2.     Phenomenological ratings 
For each memory, personal and vicarious, participants provided associated ratings for 
the event they had previously described in order to assess phenomenological 
properties. The questions were asked in the following order: how difficult was it for you 
to identify and retrieve this event from your memory? (1=not at all difficult, 5=very 
difficult); what were your emotions associated with the event? (1=very negative, 
5=very positive); how intense were your emotions during/toward this event? (1=not at 
all intense, 5=very intense); how vivid is this event in your mind’s eye? (1=not at all 
vivid, 5=very vivid); how morally wrong was the action performed? (1=Not at all morally 
wrong, 5=Very morally wrong); how frequently have you thought or talked about the 
event since it happened/your friend/family member shared with you? (1=Not frequently 
at all, 5=Very frequently); to what extent do you believe you are the same person 
compared to when the event occurred/your friend/family member shared it with you? 
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(1=Very similar, 5=Very different). For the questions addressing vicarious memories, 
the words were changed slightly to reflect the impact that the friend’s or family 
member’s memory had on the participant. 
2.3.3.     Autoneosis 
Two of the ratings addressed the participant’s autonoetic consciousness and sense of 
‘mental time travel’ using a five point scale (1=completely disagree, 5=completely 
agree). The statements were: when I think of this past event I have a sense of going 
into the past and finding myself at the time when the event occurred; when I think of 
this past event I feel like I am really experiencing the situation as if I’m there.  
2.3.4.     Autobiographical memory functions 
Participants were asked to provide ratings addressing self, social and emotional 
functions on a five point scale (1=completely disagree, 5=completely agree). The 
statements for the personal memories were: this past event tells me something about 
my identity (who I am); this past event helps me understand myself; this past event 
influences the relationships I have with others; this past event prepares me to deal 
with an emotion I might have in the future. For vicarious memories, the phrase ‘this 
past event’ was replaced with ‘this past event of my friend’s/family member’s’. 
3.    RESULTS 
3.1.     Content analysis 
Content analyses took place individually for both recent and distant memories in the 
actor, recipient and vicarious memories therefore, six sets of themes were identified.  
3.1.1.     Actor perspective 
For recent personal memories in which the participant was the actor, lying to get out 
of plans such as work, nights out with friends and dates was a recurrent theme. 
Responses also included participants lying to avoid conflict, lying regarding their 
whereabouts, trivial white lies e.g. lying to avoid telling someone that they were 
running late, and other idiosyncratic responses. 
Lying to get out of plans e.g. work, a night out or just simply to avoid seeing someone 
were frequent amongst distant personal memory responses where the participant was 
the actor. Other recollections described experiences of committing adultery, lying 
regarding their whereabouts, white lies and other idiosyncratic responses.  
3.1.2.     Recipient perspective 
For recent personal memories in which the participant was the recipient of a lie, 
responses showed a frequency of lies told within the workplace, Other responses 
included those of people lying to the participant regarding theft (financial and material), 
adultery, lying to get out of plans with friends white lies and other idiosyncratic 
responses. 
For distant personal memories where the participant was on the receiving end of a lie, 
adultery was a reoccurring response along with theft, lying to get out of plans (e.g. 
social events) or avoid seeing someone. Other responses included lying about current 
whereabouts, lying to avoid getting into trouble (e.g. physical abuse, damage to a car) 
and other idiosyncratic responses. 
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3.1.3.     Vicarious perspective 
For recent vicarious memories, responses fell into various categories such as 
recollections of friend/family member’s experience of a partner’s adultery, lying to 
avoid embarrassment and other idiosyncratic responses. 
For distant vicarious memories, responses included recollections of friend’s 
experiences involving a partner committing adultery, a friend or family member’s 
experience of theft and being lied to about it, a friend or family member being lied to 
so the person could get out of plans and other idiosyncratic responses  
3.2.     Morality and emotion 
For perceived moral wrongness, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had not been violated, X²(14)=16.80, p=.274. A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA of perceived morality showed a statistically significant 
difference in scores across the six different memory types, F(5,95)=5.13, p<.05 (see 
figure 1). A post hoc pairwise comparison test indicated that the mean score for 
morality of recipient-distant memories (M=4.20, SD=0.89) and vicarious-distant 
memories (M=4.50, SD=0.89) were significantly different from actor-recent (M=3.30, 
SD=1.26), actor-distant (M=3.05, SD=1.31) and recipient recent (M=3.55, SD=1.10) 
memory scores. However, recipient-distant and vicarious-distant scores of morality 
were not significantly different from one another (p>.05). Actor-recent morality scores 
showed no significant difference from actor-distant, recipient-recent and vicarious 
recent scores (M=3.95, SD=1.15). Actor-distant scores showed no significant 
difference from recipient-recent and vicarious recent scores. Recipient-recent scores 
were not significantly different from vicarious-recent scores and finally, the mean 
scores of recipient-distant and vicarious recent scores did not differ significantly from 
vicarious-distant scores. 
For perceived valence, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, X²(14)=25.26, p=.034 therefore the degrees of freedom 
were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of Sphericity (ε=.83). Results for the 
ANOVA of perceived valence showed a statistically significant difference in scores 
across the six different memory types, F(4.14,78.70)=4.86, p<.05 (see figure 2). A 
post-hoc pairwise comparison test indicated that the mean score of valence for 
recipient-distant memoires (M=1.50,SD=0.60) was significantly difference from 
recipient recent (M=2.15, SD=1.31), actor-distant (M=2.70, SD=1.26), actor-recent 
(M=2.60, SD=0.82) and vicarious-recent (M=2.05, SD=0.76) scores for valence. 
Vicarious-distant (M=1.85, SD=0.88) scores for memory valence showed to be 
significantly distant from actor-recent and actor-distant scores and finally, vicarious-
recent scores differed significantly from actor-recent scores. However, results showed 
that recipient-recent memory scores did not significantly differ from vicarious-distant, 
actor-distant, actor-recent and vicarious-recent valence scores. Actor-distant scores 
did not significantly differ from vicarious-recent or actor-recent scores and finally, 
vicarious-distant scores showed no significant difference from recipient-distant and 
vicarious recent scores. 
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3.3.    Temporal distance and emotion 
 An initial ANOVA showed no significant interaction between time and valence of 
memories within the actor perspective, F(1,19)=0.112, p>.05. A second ANOVA 
indicated no significant interaction between time and emotional intensity within the 
actor perspective, F(1,19)=1.75, P>.05. A third ANOVA showed no significant 
interaction between time and perceived morality within the actor perspective, 
F(1,19)=0.40, p>.05. However, a final ANOVA indicated a significant interaction 
between temporal distance and perceived personal change, F(1,19)=4.75, p<.05. 
Perceived personal change in the actor-recent perspective (M=1.85, SD=1.18) 
significantly differed from perceived personal change in the actor-distant perspective 
(M=2.85, SD=1.73). 
3.4.    Memory qualities 
For retrieval difficulty, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had not been violated, X²(14)=14.04, p=.451. An ANOVA showed a 
statistically significant difference in scores across the six different memory types, 
F(5,95)=3.66, P<.05 (see figure 3). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicate that actor-
recent scores (M=2.20, SD=1.36) and recipient-recent scores (M=1.95, SD=1.19) for 
retrieval difficulty were significantly different from actor-distant (M=3.00, SD=1.52) and 
vicarious-distant scores (M=2.90, SD=1.48). Vicarious-recent (M=2.15, SD=1.46) and 
recipient-distant (M=2.35, SD=1.42) scores showed no significant difference from any 
of the other memory types. Actor-recent scores showed no significant difference from 
recipient-recent and actor-distant scores showed no significant difference from 
vicarious-distant scores.  
For emotional intensity, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had not been violated, X²(14)=19.73, p=.142. The ANOVA results showed 
a statistically significant difference between mean scores for emotional intensity of 
memories, F(5,95)=3.42, p=.007 (see figure 4). A post-hoc pairwise comparison test 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Actor Recipient Vicarious
M
e
a
n
 t
o
ta
l 
v
a
le
n
c
e
 s
c
o
re
Memory type
Percieved Valence
Recent Distant
0
1
2
3
4
5
Actor Recipient Vicarious
M
e
a
n
 t
o
ta
l 
p
e
rc
iv
e
d
 m
o
ra
lit
y 
s
c
o
re
Memory type
Percieved morality
Recent Distant
Figure 1: Mean score of perceived 
morality for actor, recipient and vicarious 
memories in recent and distant temporal 
distances.  
Figure 2: Mean score of perceived 
valence for actor, recipient and vicarious 
memories in recent and distant temporal 
distances.  
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indicated that the mean score of emotional intensity for recipient-distant scores 
(M=3.80, SD=0.25) was significantly different from actor-recent (M=2.55, SD=0.24), 
actor-distant (M=2.95, SD=0.28) and vicarious-recent (M=2.75, SD=0.30) scores. 
Additionally, recipient-recent scores (M=3.60, SD=0.23) of emotional intensity were 
significantly different from vicarious-recent and actor-recent scores (see, figure 3). 
Vicarious-distant (M=scores of emotional intensity showed no significant difference 
from the mean scores of any other memory types. Vicarious-recent scores did not 
differ significantly from either of the actor scores, recipient-recent scores did not differ 
significantly from actor-distant or recipient-distant and finally, actor-recent scores did 
not significantly differ from actor-distant scores. 
For memory vividness, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had not been violated, X²(14)=14.79, p=.397. An ANOVA showed significant 
main effects of memory types for the vividness of a memory, F(5,95)=3.37, p<.05 (see 
figure 5). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference in memory 
vividness of actor-distant scores (M=2.80, SD=1.32) from actor-recent (M=3.60, 
SD=1.50), recipient-recent (M=4.10, SD=1.07) and recipient-distant (M=3.85, 
SD=1.14). Additionally, vicarious-distant scores of vividness (M=3.10, SD=1.25) 
differed significantly from recipient-recent and recipient distant scores.  
Two of the ratings addressed the participant’s mental time travel/autonoesis, 1) I have 
a sense of going into the past and finding myself at the time the event happened; 2) I 
feel like I am really experiencing the situation as if I am there. For the first question, 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been 
violated, X²(14)=22.94, p=.063. An ANOVA indicated a statistically significant 
difference between the scores, F(5,95)=2.58, P<.05 (see figure 7a). Post-hoc 
comparisons showed that recipient-distant scores (M=3.80, SD=1.32) differed 
significantly from vicarious-recent (M=2.95, SD=1.39), actor-distant (M=2.80, 
SD=1.44) and actor-recent scores (M=2.90, SD=1.37). Vicarious-distant (M=3.10, 
SD=1.58) scores did not significantly differ from any of the other memory score, 
vicarious-recent scores did not differ significantly from recipient-recent (M=3.45, 
SD=1.47), actor-distant and actor-recent scores, actor recent scores did not 
significantly differ from actor distant and recipient-recent scores and finally recipient-
recent scores did not significantly differ from actor-distant. For the second question, 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been 
violated, X²(14)=18.78, p=.177. An ANOVA showed a statistically significant difference 
between scores across the six different memory types, F(5,95)=3.30, p<.05 (see figure 
7b). The post-hoc test showed that both actor-recent (M=2.75, SD=1.55) and actor-
distant (M=2.75, SD=1.29) were significantly different to both recipient-recent 
(M=3.55, SD=1.28) and recipient-distant (M=3.85, SD=1.18) scores. Additionally, 
recipient-distant scores differed significantly from both vicarious-recent (M=2.85, 
SD=1.57) and vicarious-distant (M=3.00, SD=1.59) scores. Vicarious-distant scores 
did not significantly differ from vicarious-recent, recipient-recent, actor-recent and 
actor-distant scores, recipient-recent scores didn’t differ significantly from recipient-
distant or vicarious-recent scores, actor-recent scores did not differ significantly from 
vicarious-recent or actor-distant and finally actor-distant scores did not significantly 
differ from vicarious-recent scores. 
The final memory quality participants rated was the frequency they thought and talked 
about the memory. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, X²(14)=24.325, p=.044 therefore the degrees of freedom 
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were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε=.69). Results 
for the ANOVA of frequency showed a statistically significant difference in scores 
across the six memory types, F(3.43,65.11)=3.83, p<.05 (see figure 6). The post hoc 
comparisons indicate that actor-distant (M=1.45, SD=0.69) scores for frequency 
significantly differ from both recipient conditions (recent, M=2.75, SD=1.12; distant, 
M=2.95, SD=1.28) and both vicarious conditions (recent, M=2.65, SD=1.57; distant, 
M=2.60, SD=1.57). Actor-recent scores (M=2.00, SD=1.03) were not significantly 
different from actor-distant, recipient-recent, vicarious-recent and vicarious-distant 
scores. Recipient-recent scores were not significantly different from recipient-distant 
and both vicarious conditions and finally, recipient-distant scores were not significant 
from both vicarious conditions. 
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Figure 3: Mean score of retrieval 
difficulty for actor, recipient and 
vicarious memories in recent and 
distant temporal distances.  
Figure 4: Mean score of emotional 
intensity for actor, recipient and vicarious 
memories in recent and distant temporal 
distances.  
Figure 5: Mean score of vividness for 
actor, recipient and vicarious 
memories in recent and distant 
temporal distances.  
Figure 6: Mean score of frequency 
talk/thought about for actor, recipient 
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3.5.    Memory functions 
Due to the questionnaire including two questions addressing self-functions, a 
Pearson’s correlation was computed for all 6 memory types to assess the relationship 
between two variables assessing self-functions; 1) the memory tells me something 
about my identity (self-variable 1), 2) this memory helps me to understand myself (self-
variable 2).  For actor-recent memories, there was a strong positive correlation 
between the two variables, r=.808, n=20, p=.000). For actor-distant memories, no 
significant correlation was identified, r=.403, n=20, p=.078. For recipient recent 
memories, a strong positive correlation was identified between the 2 variables, r=.980, 
n=20, p=.000. For recipient distant memories, a strong positive correlation was 
identified between the 2 variables, r=.794, n=20, p=.000. For vicarious recent 
memories, a strong positive correlation was identified between the 2 variables, r=.669, 
n=20, p=.001. For vicarious distant memories, a strong positive correlation was 
identified between the 2 variables, r=.811, n=20, p=.000. Due to there being no 
correlation between variables in the actor distant condition, an average was not 
computed between self-variable 1 and self-variable 2 and for the sake of the following 
data analysis, they were treated as two separate variables.  
After assuming sphericity (X²(14)=16.11, p=.311, an ANOVA showed statistically 
significant results for this memory tells me something about my identity, F(5,95)=4.11, 
p<.05. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed vicarious-distant (M=2.45, SD=1.15) 
ratings as significantly different from both actor memory types (recent, M=3.15, 
SD=1.35; distant, M=3.25, SD=1.64) and recipient-distant scores (M=3.80, SD=1.01) 
and recipient-distant scores as significantly different from vicarious-recent (M=2.50, 
SD=1.15) and recipient-recent scores (M=2.70, SD=1.53). 
After assuming sphericity (X²(14)=12.02, p=.609, an ANOVA showed statistically 
significant results for this memory helps me to understand myself, F(5,90)=3.05, 
p<.05. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed recipient-distant (M=3.68, SD=1.20) 
scores as significantly different from both vicarious memory types (recent, M=2.53, 
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Page 18 of 26 
 
SD=1.26; distant, M=2.53, SD=1.35) and recipient-recent scores (M=2.47, SD=1.39) 
as well as recipient-recent scores as significantly different from actor-distant scores 
(M=3.42, SD=1.46). Actor-recent scores (M=2.95, SD=.35) did not significantly differ 
from scores of any other memory types. 
After assuming sphericity (X²(14)=6.61, p=.950, an ANOVA showed statistically 
significant results for this memory influences my relationships with others, 
F(5,95)=2.94, p<.05. Post hoc pairwise comparisons showed that recipient-distant 
scores (M=4.20, SD=1.12) were significantly different from actor-recent (M=2.85, 
SD=1.57), and both vicarious memory types (recent, M=2.95, SD=1.39; distant, 
M=3.00, SD=1.38). Actor-distant (M=3.60, SD=1.47) and recipient-recent scores 
(M=3.55, SD=1.32) did not significantly differ from any of the other memory type 
scores and actor-recent scores (M=2.85, SD=1.57) did not significantly differ from 
either vicarious memory type scores. 
After assuming sphericity (X²(14)=11.18, p=.676, an ANOVA showed statistically 
significant results for this memory prepares me to deal with an emotion I might have 
in the future, F(5,95)=2.71, p<.05. . Post hoc pairwise comparisons showed that 
recipient-distant scores (M=4.20, SD=1.12) were significantly different from actor-
recent (M=2.85, SD=1.57), and both vicarious memory types (recent, M=2.95, 
SD=1.39; distant, M=3.00, SD=1.38). Actor-distant (M=3.60, SD=1.47) and recipient-
recent scores (M=3.55, SD=1.32) did not significantly differ from any of the other 
memory type scores and actor-recent scores did not significantly differ from either 
vicarious memory type scores. 
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4.     DISCUSSION 
This study is the first of its kind to examine the concept of vicarious and personal 
autobiographical memories of lying as an everyday behaviour. The study aimed to 
investigate the differences between the influence of 3 memory types; actor, recipient 
and vicarious on self-identity when recalling memories of lying as well as addressing 
the phenomenological and functional qualities of the memories. Four main hypotheses 
were established based on the existing research in three domains; autobiographical 
memory, morality and vicarious memory. Firstly, personal events in which the 
participant had lied to someone (actor perspective), will be rated as less morally wrong 
and less negative than personal events where the participant had been lied to 
(recipient) as well as when a friend/family member had been lied to (vicarious 
memories). Secondly, it was expected that vicarious memories will be rated as less 
morally wrong and less negative than recipient memories where the participant had 
been lied to. Thirdly, it was expected that for personal memories in the actor 
perspective, participants would rate themselves as more similar to themselves now 
than the distant memories and subsequently the recent memories would be rated as 
less morally wrong and less negative than the distant memories. Finally, vicarious 
memory ratings for phenomenological and functional qualities were expected to 
closely resemble personal memories but at a lower intensity. 
In addition to analysis of the ratings, content analysis showed similarity in the major 
themes for actor and recipient memories of lying for example, many recollections 
focused on lying to get out of work/plans in general. Furthermore, a commonly 
reoccurring theme amongst the vicarious recollections was that of a friend or family 
member being lied to about a partner committing adultery.  
Results showed that retrieval difficulty appeared to be fairly similar across all memory 
types (See figure 3) although mean scores suggest recent memories were slightly 
easier than distant memories to recall for each condition. Recipient memories 
appeared to be slightly easier to retrieve than the other memory types. Consistent with 
the expectations, both recent and distant memories of events where the individual 
committed the lie (actor) were rated as less morally wrong than memories where the 
lie was told to the participant (recipient) as well as when the lie was told to a friend or 
family member (vicarious), however, only in the distant conditions. Similarly, 
participants rated the events where they committed the lie (actor) as less negative 
than when the lie was told to a friend or family member (vicarious) and events where 
the lie was told to the participant (recipient), but only in the distant condition.  
Research in the field of autobiographical memory suggests that recollections of events 
from the past are susceptible to bias and distortions which serve a self-enhancement 
and self-protection function (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Ross, 1989). Therefore, 
consistent with existing research demonstrating that individuals perceive themselves 
as more positive than they perceive other people (e.g.Conway, Singer &Tagini, 2004; 
D’Argembeau & Linden, 2008; Stanley et al, 2017), the current results indicate that for 
autobiographical memories of lying, people tend to recall events whereby they 
committed the act, as less morally wrong and less negative than events where 
someone else committed the act or where the act was committed toward a friend or 
family member. By viewing one’s behaviours as somewhat superior and better than 
other’s whether it be a family member or friend on the receiving end or the individual 
themselves (Alicke & Govorun, 2005), facilitates self-enhancement and also 
demonstrates consistency with the concept that moral laden events, in this case lying, 
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are paramount to the construction of the self-identity (Strohminger et al, 2017). 
Furthermore, based on the current findings we can infer that people are either 
susceptible to memory distortions and reconstructions that support a positive self-
image, or we make a social comparison and are motivated to consciously remember 
events that support a more positive self-image than for others. Research has 
suggested that there’s a multitude of variables that may play a role in the way people 
perceive the severity of an aversive behaviour such as lying. Knapp and Comadena 
(1979, as cited in Bryant, 2008) suggested that individual’s judge a lie based on the 
motivation of the person lying, the extent to which the person lying was aware of their 
actions and finally the effects that lying would have on the people involved. It would 
seem logical for a person who is recalling a memory of themselves lying to someone, 
to perceive the severity of the lie and subsequently the morality and negativity as less 
aversive in order to support their positive self-image which again, supports self-
enhancement. For example, for the actor memories, research suggests that we self-
enhance to maintain a positive identity (e.g. Stanley et al 2017) and so there is 
potentiality for us to remember and perceive actor memories of lies as less severe in 
order to support a positive self-identity. Our findings support the notion of self-
enhancement however, future research could focus on exploring the process involved 
when an individual subjectively judges the severity of their own behaviours compared 
to when they judge other people’s behaviours. 
Following on from this, the mean perceived morality (see Figure 1) and mean 
perceived valence (see figure 2) ratings are of particular interest when looking at 
vicarious memories. It was expected that vicarious memories where the participant 
was told about a time a friend or family member was lied to, would closely resemble 
recipient ratings where the participant was directly lied to, but at lower level. However, 
mean ratings show that vicarious memories were actually rated as slightly more 
morally wrong. This closely relates to the content analysis which shows what could be 
perceived as more serious and aversive recollections for vicarious memories e.g. a 
friend or family member being cheated on and lied to about it, compared to both types 
of personal memories where the themes seemed to be of a more trivial and less 
serious nature. This finding could be explained in terms of the types of lies and their 
consequences. Bryant’s (2008) findings showed that people described white lies as 
“lacking malicious motives and generally acceptable to use”, and gray lies were 
described as “justifiable”. We can infer from the current findings, that the recollections 
of more trivial lies for personal memories in the actor perspective could be due to the 
individual’s belief that their behaviour was generally acceptable and therefore posed 
no detrimental effect to their self-identity, again maintaining a positive self-view. 
Furthermore, significant results showed that people perceive themselves as more 
similar to their current selves for the recent events compared to the distant events. 
However, in contrast with expected findings, temporal distance was found to have no 
particular main effect on scores for perceived morality, perceived valence and 
emotional intensity in the actor perspective. The current findings are therefore 
inconsistent with the temporal self-appraisal theory (Wilson & Ross, 2000) which 
suggests that we compare our present and past selves in order to perceive ourselves 
as improving over time. In the context of immoral actions, this theory would suggest 
that we perceive our past selves as worse than our current selves as this poses no 
threat to our positive self-image. The current findings support the notion of our 
perceived self progressively changing over time but show no evidence of us viewing 
our current selves as better. The results demonstrate inconsistent findings to 
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Escobedo & Adolphs (2010) whose findings gave support for temporal self-appraisal 
where participants showed to recall positively valenced memories as more recent than 
negatively valenced memories. Stanley et al (2017) also demonstrated support for 
temporal self-appraisal but for lying specifically and so the current findings are mostly 
inconstant with their results. Based on the previous research on temporal self-
appraisal this particular finding was largely unexpected. It could be argued that this 
was due to the participant numbers not being large enough to show a significant effect. 
Additionally, the mean age of participants was 29 and because age was not a 
modulated factor, it could have extraneously influenced the results and produced a 
non-significant finding for perceived morality and valence for temporally distances. 
This could be explained by Suls and Mullen (1984) who suggested that comparisons 
to our former selves are a lot less frequent than comparisons to others throughout life. 
They suggested that during periods of development i.e. childhood (3-5yrs) and old age 
(65+) we tend to use temporal comparisons and so during the period of young 
adulthood (Suls and Mullen, 1982, as cited in Wilson and Ross, 2000), social 
comparison is preferred. Based on the mean age of the participants in the current 
study, the preference for social comparisons for that age group could have potentially 
created the non-significant finding for temporal self-appraisal. In order for age to be 
modulated, future research should focus on testing temporal bias for memories of 
immoral actions on specific age groups in order to gain a wider understanding of this 
phenomena. 
Finally, as predicted, phenomenological ratings for emotion, vividness and mental time 
travel were similar across all memory types. However, the ratings were highest for 
personal memories where the participant was being lied to (recipient) followed by 
ratings for vicarious memories which bear a very similar resemblance. Participants 
showed to have less mental time travel, less vivid imagery and less emotional intensity 
when trying to recall memories of times they have lied to someone (actor). Moreover, 
participant ratings also indicated that vicarious memories of lying hold many of the 
same functional qualities as the two types of personal memories (actor and recipient), 
but as expected, at a lower intensity. These results are consistent with Pillemer et al’s 
(2015) findings which demonstrated a close resemblance between functional and 
phenomenological qualities of personal and vicarious memories. Furthermore, Lind & 
Thomsen (2018) conducted a very recent study that provided supporting evidence for 
the influence of vicarious life stories (which depend on autobiographical memory) on 
an individual’s self-identity of which the current findings are consistent with. Moreover, 
the findings suggests that current models of autobiographical memory such as 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) Self Memory System are flawed in the sense they 
do not account for vicarious autobiographical memories and as a result can be 
perceived as too restrictive. Although the preliminary study only addresses a small 
fragment of questions regarding the phenomenological and functions properties of 
personal and vicarious memories of lying, they certainly establish the potential 
significance.  
Despite the current study providing relevant and important findings for personal and 
vicarious autobiographical memories of lying, limitations are evident. The main 
limitation, is that of the small samples size. This reduces the ecological validity of the 
results as it may not be an appropriate representation of the wider population. This 
creates a gap for further research to study a larger sample in order to validate the 
current findings and hopefully produce results that can be transferred onto a wider 
scope of the population. Another limitation to consider is the self-report nature of the 
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questionnaire and so it is important to identify the potential possibility that not all 
participants were truthful in their responses, especially when recalling memories of 
times they’d lied to someone as these memories could be susceptible to distortions 
(Alicke & Govurun, 2005). Another limiting factor to acknowledge is the repetitiveness 
of the questionnaire’s structure. The memory cues and associated ratings were 
repeated for all six memory types and despite Qualtrics.com counterbalancing the 
order in which they were presented to the participant, it could be true that participants 
experienced respondent fatigue. This may be the reason not all participants were able 
to complete the questionnaire fully and could reduce the internal and external validity 
for the completed responses. Moreover, it is important to identify the limitations that 
come as a result of using a 5-point Likert scale to quantify the true thoughts and 
feelings of the participant. It is a real possibility that responses could’ve been greatly 
influenced by previous questions, causing participants to consistently pick the same 
answer. In the real world, attitudes, perceptions and beliefs are not refined to a Likert 
scale and so the methodology is reductionist in terms of explaining human behaviour.  
The present study’s findings offer a significant addition to the growing literature on the 
effects of remembering autobiographical experiences of immoral actions on the 
perception of one’s self-identity by applying the phenomena to vicarious memories. 
The findings show that participants perceive their own immoral actions as less morally 
wrong and less negative than recipient lies as well as vicarious lies. This gives the 
individual a sense of feeling better than others when it comes down to moral 
transgressions and therefore provides a self-enhancing effect. In conclusion, the 
current findings offer supporting evidence for the concept of people perceiving 
themselves as better than others when recalling situations of lying. Additionally, the 
results contribute important novel findings to the field of vicarious memories by 
expanding existing research to that of specific behaviours i.e. lying. These findings 
indicate that vicarious memory plays an important role in the construction of the self 
when one recalls a time that either a friend or family member has been lied to, even 
when the immoral action did not directly involve the individual.  Overall, the results of 
the current study provide a solid platform for further research into vicarious and 
personal autobiographical memories and morality/immorality. 
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